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¢Photo 1: Launch of Shuttle Mission STS-95
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1.0 SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
STS-95 consisted of OV-103 (25 th flight), ET-98 and BI-096 SRB's on MLP-2 and Pad 39B.
Discovery was launched at 98:302:19:19:33.984 UTC (2:19 p.m. local) on 29 October 1998.
Landing was at 12:04 p.m. local/eastern time on 7 November 1998.
Drag Chute Door
An IFA concerning loss of the drag chute door at liftoff was generated as a result of real-time
surveillance by the Ice Team.
The drag chute door detached from the drag chute compartment (shear pin side) at 19:19:30.648
UTC. The door swung downward pivoting about the hinge at 19:19:30.998, then dropped
vertically from the hinge until impacting the SSME #1 aft manifold at 19:19:31.301 UTC. The
impact caused the door to be deflected in the +Z direction and continue to fall aft into the SSME
flame trench. No damage to the SSME #1 nozzle was visible. After an IFA was taken, an
Anomaly Investigation Board was formed to investigate the premature release of the door.
Long range tracking films showed no indications that components of the drag chute or debris
objects originating from the drag chute compartment fell aft during ascent.
Post launch analysis of high speed films showed the drag chute was intact and properly restrained
by nylon straps inside the drag chute compartment. There were no visual indications that any of
the pyrotechnic devices had fired (the sabot cover adjacent to the drag chute was intact).
Measurements of the door's motion revealed the door had not been propelled open from the
chute compartment, but just fell away due to gravity only.
After Orbiter landing, the drag chute and associated hardware inside the drag chute compartment
appeared to be in excellent condition with very few visible heat effects. The deployment system
was assessed and determined to be safe for towing to the OPF without firing the pyrotechnic
devices on the runway. In addition, SSME #1 appeared to be undamaged by the drag chute door
impact. A white scuff mark was visible on the aft manifold at the nozzle exit plane directly aft of
the door hinge location. The metal was not bent or deformed.
Signs for early shear pin failure or door separation from the door frame were checked in the
launch photography. Initially in the investigation, the apparent gap between the door and the
chute compartment was thought to be significant but was later determined to be an expected
interface line between adjacent TPS-covered carrier panels. The actual door structure would not
be visible.
Laboratory analysis, conducted on door pieces recovered on the pad, showed no anomalies. The
shear pin fragments exhibited the proper material properties and hardness. Review of the as-built
paper, OMI documentation, and interviews with technicians uncovered no installation problems
or workmanship discrepancies.
Subsequent attempts to duplicate the door failure in the laboratory were not entirely successful
leaving the Investigation Board to conclude an unexplained anomaly possibly associated with the
environment - an acoustic vibration or overpressure wave that exceeded the design parameters of
the door. The pad and MLP for the next few launches will be instrumented to gather data on the
SSME startup environment. In addition, the drag chute door design is being modified and will
incorporate greater material margins. Until that effort is complete, the drag chute door will be
bolted to the Orbiter structure and landings will be made without using the chute.
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2.0 PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for tanking test activities was
conducted on 28 October 1998 at 1400 hours. The following personnel participated in various
team activities, assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports
contained in this document.
P. Weber NASA - KSC
G. Katnik NASA - KSC
R. Speece NASA - KSC
R. Stevens NASA - KSC
J. Rivera NASA - KSC
R. Page NASA - KSC
K. Revay USA - SPC
J. Blue USA - SPC
W. Richards USA - SPC
M. Wollam USA- SPC
G. Fales USA - SPC
T. Ford USA - SPC
C. Hill BNA - LSS
J. Cook THIO - LSS
S. Otto LMSO - LSS
J. Ramirez LMSO - LSS
Chief, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems Branch
Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems
Thermal Protection Systems
Infrared Scanning Systems; SRB Mechanical Sys
ET Mechanisms/Structures
SSP Integration
Supervisor, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
ET Mechanical Systems
Systems Integration
SRM Processing
ET Processing
ET Processing
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Two cracksweredetectedin the+Y+Z quadrant of the intertank. One crack 6-8 inches in length
was located in the second stringer valley in the +Y direction from the PAL ramp; the second
crack was 10-12 inches in length and located in the fourth stringer valley in the +Z direction from
the PAL ramp. The cracks appeared to originate from the as-sprayed foam at the aft end of the
stringers extending forward from the LH2 tank splice. A third crack 6-8 inches long was located
in the -Y-Z quadrant in the second stringer valley from the thrust panel. All cracks were no
greater than 1/16 inch wide with no visible offset or ice/frost formation and were acceptable for
flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria and IPR rationale from the flight of the first Super Light
Weight Tank (STS-91).
The Final Inspection Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on
the LH2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from upper 50's to low 60's (degrees F)
depending more on sunlit versus shadowed area readings than the "thick/thin" TPS configuration.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows and support
brackets.
A 4-inch long by 1/4-inch wide stress relief crack had formed, as expected, on the -Y vertical
strut forward facing TPS. There was no ice/frost present and no offset. The condition was
acceptable for launch per the NSTS-08303 criteria.
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice/frost accumulations were
limited to small patches on the aft and inboard sides. Ice/frost fingers on the separation bolt
pyrotechnic canister purge vents were typical.
Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. The LH2
feedline bellows were wet with condensate.
Less than usual amounts of ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge
barrier top and outboard sides. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and
plate gap purge vents. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable
replenish, and launch.
3.2.4 FACILITY
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch.
No leaks were observed on the GUCP or the LO2 and LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals.
3.3 T-3 HOURS TO LAUNCH
After completion of the Final Inspection on the pad, surveillance continued from the Launch
Control Center. Twenty-two remote controlled television cameras and two infrared radiometers
were utilized to perform scans of the vehicle. No ice or frost on the acreage TPS was detected.
Protuberance icing did not increase noticeably. At T-2:30, the GOX vent seals were deflated and
the GOX vent hood lifted. Although frost covered some of the ET nose cone louvers - an
expected condition - no ice was detected. When the heated purge was removed by retraction of
the GOX vent hood, frost continued to form on the louvers and area of the composite nose cone
surrounding the louvers until liftoff.
Photo 2:STS-95 Ready for Launch
OV-103 Discovery (25 th flight), ET-98, and BI-096 SRB's on Pad 39B and MLP-2. The Final
Inspection Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on the LH2
tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from upper 50's to low 60's degrees F.
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Photo 3:LO2 Tank After Cryoload
The Final Inspection Team observed very light condensate, but no ice or frost accumulations, on
the LO2 tank acreage. TPS surface temperatures ranged from high 70's to low 80's degrees F.
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Photo 4: Cracks in Intertank Foam
Two cracks were detected in the +Y+Z quadrant of the intertank. One crack was 6-8 inches in
length while the second crack was 10-12 inches in length. A third crack (shown here) 6-8 inches
long was located in the -Y-Z quadrant in the second stringer valley from the thrust panel. The
cracks appeared to originate from the as-sprayed foam at the aft end of the stringers extending
forward from the LH2 tank splice.
Photo 5:LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical
Less than usual ice accumulated on the top and outboard sides of the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical.
Ice/frost fingers on the pyrotechnic canister and plate gap purge vents were typical. Note the two
places of trimmed foam on the -Y vertical strut aft surface.
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Figure 1: Number of Divots vs. Flight Time
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Photo 17: ET Thrust Panel at SRB Separation
Note absence of divots on the aft section of ET thrust panel (aft of the EB fitting)29
Photo 18: ET -Z Side
TPS on ET -Z side is in excellent condition. No divots are visible in the LH2 tank flange.
Likewise, MSA insulation on SRB forward skirt is in excellent condition just after separation.
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Photo 19: SRB Separation from External Tank
TPS on ET third hard point and aft dome is in good condition.
Orbiter elevons and a portion of the body flap are visible to the left of the ET aft dome.
31
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Photo 20: -Y Vertical Strut
Pre-Launch view of trimmed foam on -Y vertical strut aft surface
32
LPhoto 21: SRB Separation from ET
SRB separation from ET was nominal. Note condition of trimmed foam areas on ET -Y vertical
strut (arrows) two minutes into flight. Also note typical erosion of foam from aft surface of the
LO2 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray.
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Photo 22: ET LH2 ET/ORB Umbilical
View from ET LH2 ET/ORB umbilical 16mm camera shows no damage to the LH2 umbilical
after separation. Note frozen hydrogen in the 17-inch flapper valve. Also note accumulation of
ice at XT-2058 adjacent to the transportation fitting closeout (arrow).
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Photo 23: ET LO2 ET/ORB Umbilical
A 6x4 inch shallow divot at XT-1851 was located at the leading edge of the pressurization line
ramp. Erosion of the LO2 feedline flange closeouts was typical. Ascent erosion and debris impact
sites were visible on the +Y thrust strut in the SLA, the TPS covering, and the flange closeout.
The LO2 ET/ORB umbilical cable tray exhibited typical erosion and divoting.
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Photo 24: Bipods Pre-Launch View
Pre-Launch view of ET bipods, bipod jack pad stand off closeouts, and
LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout
36
Photo25: Divots in LH2 Tank FlangeCloseout
Both bipod jack pad standoff closeouts were intact. Two 10-12 inch diameter divots occurred in
the LH2 tank-to-intertank flange closeout between the ET centerline and the -Y jack pad standoff
closeout (which did not appear to be affected by the proximity of the divot). LH2 tank acreage
TPS was in excellent condition.
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Photo 26:ET-98 SLWT LO2 Tank
Sixteen small divots occurred in the area inboard of the EB fitting between the circumferential
ribs. In the next section separated by circumferential ribs forward of the EB fitting, 6 very small
divots could be discerned, though a bright spot on a ramp was thought to be a divot 3-inches in
diameter. Only two divots could be seen in the next section forward. A 7-inch long divot was
present on an intertank stringer head in the -Y direction from the +Z aero vent. No primer or
substrate was detected in the divot.
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Photo 27: ET +Y Side
Crew hand held view of External Tank showing no nose cone or +Y side anomalies
39
Photo 6: Overall View of SSME #3
First flight of Dow-Corning 93-104 silicone ablative material to insulate SSME nozzle aft
manifolds during re-entry. The red-colored "insulator panels" were applied to 135 degrees of
SSME #2 and #3 aft manifold -Z sides to preclude "bluing" (due to heating at 1200-1400 degrees
Fahrenheit) detected on previous flights.
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4.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION
The post launch inspection of MLP 2, Pad B FSS, RSS, and pad apron was conducted on 29-30
October 1998 from Launch + 2 hours to dusk, and 1.5 hours on the 30th.
Eighteen pieces of the Orbiter drag chute door were recovered on the south side of the pad from
the SSME flame trench to the perimeter fence. The door separated from the Orbiter 2 seconds
after SSME ignition. No other flight hardware was found.
No stud hang-ups occurred on this launch. Boeing-Downey reported an Orbiter liftoff lateral
acceleration of 0.13 g's, which is below the threshold (0.14 g's) for stud hang-ups. SRB south
holddown post erosion was less than usual. North holddown post blast covers and T-0 umbilicals
exhibited typical exhaust plume damage. The SRB aft skirt GN2 purge lines had remained
upright after liftoff. However, both purge flex lines exhibited structural damage and melting of
the exterior wire braid.
The Tail Service Masts (TSM's) appeared undamaged and the bonnets were closed properly.
There was no unusual erosion at the bases of the TSMs where excess grout had been removed.
Likewise, the Orbiter Access Arm (OAA) was undamaged.
The GH2 vent line was latched in the fifth of eight teeth of the latching mechanism. The GUCP
7-inch QD surface exhibited no apparent damage. All observations indicated a nominal retraction
and latchback, though the GH2 vent line exhibited heat effects/damage from the SRB exhaust
plume. The aluminized thermal blanket was torn and scorched by the plume.
The GOX vent arm showed no indications of plume damage.
Debris findings on the FSS included loose cable tray covers at the 175 and 195 foot levels, an
approximate 2 foot section of l-Y2 inch angle iron at the 245 foot level stairs, and the elevator
door was 'blown-in' at the 255 foot level.
No unusual debris was noted in the flame trench, in the north SRB plume blast area, or in the
acreage. Overall, damage to the pad appeared to be minimal.
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Condensationcollars formedon the vehicleduring ascent- anexpectedoccurrencedue to the
ambientweatherconditions(TV-4, TV-21).
Four debris inducedstreaksoccurredin the SSMEexhaustplumesduringascent(E-213, -222,
-223).
SRBtailoff andseparationappearednormal.Slagfalling out of theexhaustplumebefore,during,
andafterSRB separationwastypical (TV-13).
5.1.1 DRAG CHUTE DOOR INVESTIGATION
The drag chute door detached from the drag chute compartment (shear pin side) at 19:19:30.648
UTC. The door swung downward pivoting about the hinge at 19:19:30.998, then dropped
vertically from the hinge until impacting the SSME #1 aft manifold at 19:19:31.301 UTC. The
impact caused the door to be deflected in the +Z direction and continue to fall aft into the SSME
flame trench. No damage to the SSME #1 nozzle was visible. Two small, dark debris objects
were detected in the hinge area when the door detached but a possible relationship with cause or
effect could not be determined (OTV 170, 151; E-2, -3, -19, -20, -76, -77). Later, an IFA was
taken and an Anomaly Investigation Board formed to investigate the premature release of the
door.
Long range tracking films showed no indications that components of the drag chute or debris
objects originating from the drag chute compartment fell aft during ascent.
Post launch analysis of high speed films showed the drag chute was intact and properly restrained
by nylon straps inside the drag chute compartment. There were no visual indications that any of
the pyrotechnic devices had fired (the sabot cover adjacent to the drag chute was intact).
Measurements of the door's motion revealed the door had not been propelled open from the
chute compartment, but just fell away due to gravity only.
Signs for early shear pin failure or door separation from the door frame were checked. Initially in
the investigation, the apparent gap between the door and the chute compartment was thought to
be significant but was later determined to be an expected interface line between adjacent
TPS-covered carrier panels. The actual door structure would not be visible.
Laboratory analysis of the recovered door pieces showed no anomalies. The shear pin fragments
exhibited the proper material properties and hardness. Review of the as-built paper, OMI
documentation, and interviews with technicians uncovered no installation problems or
workmanship discrepancies.
Subsequent attempts to duplicate the door failure in the laboratory were not entirely successful
leaving the Investigation Board to conclude an unexplained anomaly possibly associated with the
environment - an acoustic vibration or overpressure wave that exceeded the design parameters of
the door. The pad and MLP for the next few launches will be instrumented to gather data on the
SSME startup environment. In addition, the drag chute door design is being modified and will
incorporate greater material margins. Until that effort is complete, the drag chute door will be
bolted to the Orbiter structure and landings will be made without using the chute.
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Photo 7: Drag Chute Door Closeout
Pre-Launch view of the drag chute door closeout showing -Y (shear pin) and +Y (hinge) sides.
Initially in the investigation, the apparent gap between the door and the chute compartment was
thought to be significant, but was later determined to be an expected interface line between
adjacent TPS-covered carrier panels. The actual door structure would not be visible.
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Photo 8: Drag Chute Door (E-19)
Two frames from high speed 16ram film camera E-19 running at 400 frames per second show the
drag chute door before release and subsequent impact with the SSME #1 aft manifold. No
damage to the engine nozzle was visible after the impact.
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Photo 9: Drag Chute Door (E-20)
Two frames from high speed 16ram film camera E-20 running at 400 frames per second show the
drag chute door before release and after separation from the hinge on the +Y side of the chute
compartment. Note clear detail is visible on the intact drag chute and restraining nylon straps
along with the adjacent sabot cover inside the chute compartment.
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Photo10: Drag Chute Door -Y Side
Two frames from high speed 16ram film camera E-20 running at 400 frames per second show the
drag chute door just before and at the time of impact with the SSME #1 aft manifold. Note clear
detail on the inside webbing of the door and shear pin flanges.
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Photo 11: Drag Chute Door (E-2)
Two:frames from high speed 16ram film camera E-2 running at 400 frames per second show the
drag chute door just before release and at the time of impact with the SSME #1 aft manifold. The
-Y-Z corner of the door contacted the engine nozzle causing the door to deflect in the +Z
direction without contacting any other flight hardware.
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Photo 12: Drag Chute Door (E-3)
Three frames from high speed 16ram film camera E-3 running at 400 frames per second show the
drag chute door just before release, impact with the SSME #1 aft manifold, and deflection in the
+Z direction.
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5.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
OV-103 was equipped to carry umbilical cameras: 16mm motion picture with 5 mm lens; 16mm
motion picture with 10mm lens; 35mm still views. The flight crew provided hand held still
images. The +X translation was performed.
5.2.1 SRB 8mm Video Camera
An 8mm video camera, which had previously been used to view SRB chute deployment, was
installed in the left SRB forward skirt to view a portion of the -Y thrust panel on the +Z side of
the thrust fitting. A lens with a very wide field of view was used to maximize the visible section
of thrust panel but in turn resulted in some image distortion. A grid of one-inch black squares and
asterisks spaced 5.5 inches apart were placed on the stringer head TPS to aid in divot size
measurement. Post flight review of the film revealed the field of view, exposure, focus, lighting,
and visible detail were all good.
General observations included SRB separation from the ET at 122.403 seconds MET. The
majority of divots in the ET thrust panel occurred on the rib heads/top edges. The divots were
shallow with no substrate exposed. Most of the divots were concentrated near the EB fitting,
though some divots could be seen as far outboard as the second stringer beyond the thrust panel.
Most divots were located in the NCFI. After separation, the widening field of view caused by the
booster falling away showed the entire thrust panel aft of the EB fitting and the intertank stringer
sections to the flight door area. Virtually no divots were observed in this region. The LH2 tank -Z
side acreage, aft dome, and third hard point also appeared to be in nominal condition.
Timed observations showed the appearance of the first divot at 92 seconds MET.
90 - 100 seconds: 7 divots in the field of view with none larger than 1-inch
100 - 110 seconds: 64 divots with 10-15 larger than 1-inch
110 - 120 seconds: 112 divots with approximately 30 larger than 1-inch. The largest
divot was estimated to be 2.5-inches long
120 - Separation: 122 divots total
Figure 1 shows the increasing number of divots from 92 seconds MET through SRB separation.
5.2.2 ET/ORB Umbilical 16mm Films
In the 16mm films, lighting of the ET after separation was good though the far -Y side of the ET
was in deep shadow. Focus and field of view were good.
SRB separation from the External Tank appeared nominal. The wide angle ET/ORB LH2
umbilical camera provided a view of both SRB forward skirts/frustums/nose caps during
separation. The nose caps, which are not recovered for post flight inspection, were intact and
appeared to be in good condition.
ET-98 separation from the Orbiter was normal. No divots were detected in the LO2 tank acreage.
No anomalies were detected on the composite nose. The trimmed/sanded area on the LO2 tank at
XT-536 was darkened somewhat due to ascent aeroheating, but no divoting or loss of foam
occurred.
The +Z side of the intertank generally was in good condition though some very small "popcorn"
type divots could be seen in the high heating area forward of the bipods. A divot 7 inches long
was visible on the head of a stringer in the -Y direction from the +Z aero vent. The thrust panels
were not visible in these views.
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5.2.4 Crew Hand Held Still Images
The flight crew obtained 37 images of the External Tank after separation. All of the views
showed the +Y+Z quadrant of the ET. Most of the Tank was in shadow with the exception of the
LO2 feedline and the +Z axis.
From time to time, the +Y thrust panel inboard of the EB fitting was visible. No large divots in
the TPS were detected. Divots less than 3-inches in size, which were expected based on the LH
SRB camera data, could not be discerned due to the subject distance and image resolution. The
outboard side of the +Y thrust panel was in shadow and too dark to view any kind of detail.
Live downlink from the RMS elbow camera later in the day revealed a section of AFRSI
protruding from the left OMS pod outboard side.
23
Photo 13: ET -Y Thrust Panel Markings
Pre-Launch view of the ET -Y thrust panel on the +Z side of the EB fitting. A grid of one-inch
black squares and asterisks spaced 5.5 inches apart were placed on the stringer head TPS to aid in
size measurement of divots occurring in flight.
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SRB Camera View of ET ThruSt
Forward
/
Photo 14: ET -Y Thrust Panel Camera View
Pre-Launch view of the ET -Y thrust panel as seen by the SRB video camera. A lens with a very
wide field of view was used to maximize the visible section of thrust panel but in turn resulted in
some image distortion.
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Photo 15: Thrust Panel, 92 - 102 Seconds MET
The first divot appeared at 92 seconds mission elapsed time (top photo).
The bottom photo shows the number of divots appearing in the next 10 second interval.
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Photo 16: Thrust Panel, 112 - 122 Seconds MET
27
5.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY
A total of 21 films and videos, which included nine 35mm large format films, one 16mm film,
and eleven videos, were reviewed.
The landing gear extended properly. The infrared scanners showed no debris falling from the
Orbiter during final approach.
Due to the loss of the protective drag chute door at liftoff and suspect condition of the chute
itself, the Orbiter drag chute was not deployed for this landing. Rollout and wheel stop were
uneventful.
TPS damage on the lower surface of both right and left glove areas was visible in some of the
films.
40
Photo 28: Frustum Post Flight Condition
Both frustums were in excellent condition. No TPS was missing and no debonds/unbonds were
detected over fasteners or acreage. Virtually none of the Hypalon paint had blistered or peeled.
All eight BSM aero heat shield covers had locked in the fully opened position though the attach
rings on the two outboard covers on the left frustum had been bent by parachute riser
entanglement.
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Photo29: Forward Skirt PostFlight Condition
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. RSS antennae covers/phenolic base
plates were intact. Hypalon paint was blistered/missing over the areas where BTA closeouts had
been applied. All primary frustum severance ring pins and retainer clips were intact though the
left skirt lost two back-up ring bolts and one nut at water impact.
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Photo30: Aft Booster/Aft Skirt PostFlight Condition
Separationof the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal. Damage to the fairings was attributed to
water impact. TPS on the external surface of both aft skirts was intact and in good condition. The
holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS) appeared to have functioned normally.
However, the HDP #1 and #7 DCS plungers were obstructed by frangible nut halves that most
likely was the result of water impact. There was no evidence of a stud hang-up on this launch.
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7.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT
After the 12:04 p.m. local/eastern time landing on 7 November 1998, a post landing inspection of
OV-103 Discovery was conducted at the Kennedy Space Center on SLF runway 33 and in the
Orbiter Processing Facility bay #1. This inspection was performed to identify debris impact
damage and, if possible, debris sources.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 187 hits, of which 45 had a major dimension of 1-inch or
larger. This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shield attributed to SSME
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics
from 71 previous missions of similar configuration (excluding missions STS-23, 24, 25, 26, 26R,
27R, 30, 42, 86, 87, 89, 90, and 91, which all had damage from known debris sources), indicates
both the total number of hits and the number of hits 1-inch or larger was greater than the
cumulative mission average (Reference Figures 2-4. Note: since no debris impacts were recorded
on the right side of the Orbiter, the corresponding Figure was omitted).
The following table breaks down the STS-95 Orbiter debris damage by area:
HITS > 1" TOTAL HITS
Lower surface 42 139
Upper surface 1 6
Window Area 2 33
Right side 0 0
Left side 0 4
Right OMS Pod 0 1
Left OMS Pod 0 4
TOTALS 45 187
The Orbiter lower surface sustained 139 total hits, of which 42 had a major dimension of 1-inch
or larger. Most of this damage was concentrated aft of the nose gear doors to the main landing
gear wheel wells on both left and right chines. (Virtually no damage occurred on the Orbiter
centerline. Seven small damage sites just aft of the nose gear doors were attributed to small
pieces of rubber from the nose gear tires during touchdown spinup). The outboard damage sites
on the chines followed the same location/damage pattern documented on STS-86, STS-87,
STS-89, STS-90, and STS-91. It should also be noted that this was the second flight of the new
Super Light Weight Tank. The overall size and quantity of damage sites were very similar to that
sustained from the first flight of the SLWT.
STS-86 STS-87 STS-89 STS-90 STS-91 STS-95
Lower surface total hits 100 244 95 76 145 139
Lower surface hits > 1-inch 27 109 38 11 45 42
Longest damage site 7 in. 15 in. 2.8 in. 3.0 in. 3.0 in. 4.0 in.
Deepest damage site 0.4 in. 1.5 in. 0.2 in. 0.25 in. 0.5 in. 0.4 in.
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Hazingand streakingof forward-facingOrbiter windowswasmoderateto heavy.Damagesites
on the window perimetertileswaslessthanusualin quantityandsize.Someof thedamagesites
wereattributedto old repairmaterialfalling outandwerenot includedin thisassessment.
Thepost landingwalkdownof Runway33 wasperformedimmediatelyafter landing.No debris
concernswereidentified.
In summary,both the total numberof Orbiter TPSdebrishits and the numberof hits 1-inchor
largerwasgreaterthan thecumulativefleet averagewhencomparedto previousmissions(Figure
5). Sincethedamagepatternandnumberof hits wasrelatedto the lossof TPSfrom theET thrust
panels (and therefore an identified debris source),thesedata were not incorporatedinto the
cumulativestatisticsof hits andaverages.
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@ALL MEASUREMENTS IN INCHES
_ TOTAL HITS = 4
|_• I | _. HITS > 1 INCH = o|II / ! _Carrier panel/FIB damaged
l_r_ __-_"-- _ (not a debris hit though
_ __fastener was m_g)
Figure 3: Orbiter Left Side Debris Damage Map
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Figure 5: Orbiter Post Flight Debris Damage Summary
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Photo 31: Overall View of Orbiter Sides
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Photo 32: OMS Pod TPS Damage
A partially detached carrier panel and associated FIB on the LH OMS pod near the aft RCS
thrusters was severely damaged by reentry heating• (This was the protruding panel observed on
orbit by the flight crew). The carrier panel/blanket just aft of this location was also damaged by
repeated contact with the discrepant panel flaying in the airstream.
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Photo 33: Lower Surface Tile Damage
The Orbiter lower surface sustained 139 total hits, of which 42 had a major dimension of 1-inch
or larger. Most of this damage was concentrated aft of the nose gear doors to the main landing
gear wheel wells on both left and right chines. The overall size and quantity of damage sites is
consistent with damage sustained by impacts from ET thrust panel insulation.
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Photo 34: Windows
Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows was moderate to heavy. Damage sites
on the window perimeter tiles was less than usual in quantity and size. Some of the damage sites
were attributed to old repair material falling out and were not included in this assessment.
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Photo 35: Base Heat Shield
Less than usual amounts of tile damage occurred on the base heat shield. All SSME Dome
Mounted Heat Shield (DMHS) closeout blankets were in excellent condition though there was
some fraying on the SSME #1 blanket at the 5-6 o'clock position. Note intact drag chute, which
was not used for this landing due to concerns about possible damage during ascent after losing
the drag chute door at liftoff.
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Photo 36: Drag Chute Compartment
After losing the drag chute door at liftoff, the drag chute was exposed to ascent, on-orbit, and
re-entry environments. Close examination after landing determined the drag chute was intact and
the nylon restraining straps barely discolored. There was no damage to the pyrotechnic devices or
firing lines. Also note no apparent damage to the drag chute door hinges or shear pin flanges.
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Photo 37: SSME #1 Aft Manifold
Point of impact by the drag chute door at liftoff. The impact occurred on the aft manifold and did
not damage the engine nozzle or any of the high pressure hydrogen tubes.
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1. STS-95 (OV-103) Film/Video Screening and Timing Summary
. STS-95 (OV-103): FILM/VIDEO SCREENING AND TIMING
SUMMARY
1.1 SCREENING ACTIVITIES
1.1.1 Launch
The STS-95 launch of Discovery (OV-103) from Pad B occurred on Thursday,
October 29, 1998 at approximately 302:19:19:33.994 UTC as seen on camera E8.
SRB separation occurred at approximately 19:21:36.343 UTC as seen on camera
ET207.
On launch day, 22 of the 24 expected videos were received and screened.
Camera videos KTV11 and ET213 were not received.
The drag chute door was observed to detach from the Orbiter at
302:19:19:31.060 UTC and was seen impacting the rim of SSME bell #1 at
302:19:19:31.291 UTC. The port side of the door was noted to detach first,
swinging aft in a hinge like movement, followed by the detaching of the
starboard side of the door and the complete detachment of the drag chute door
from the Orbiter. The door struck the rim of the SSME #1 bell. No damage to
the engine was noted. Image analysis support was provided to the Space
Shuttle Program for the assessment of the vehicle condition for a safe return and
landing and also on the root cause of the incident. A summary of the image
analysis support provided to the drag chute door release investigation is included
in section 2.3.
Twenty launch films were screened on November 1, 1998. Twenty-two
additional films were received for contingency support and anomaly resolution.
Umbilical well cameras flew for the second time on OV-103 on STS-95.
Photography of the left SRB and the LSRB/ET aft attach and the external tank aft
dome was acquired using umbilical well camera films during SRB separation.
Photography of the external tank was acquired during ET separation. Handheld
video and still photography of the ET was acquired following separation. For the
first time, video of the external tank -Y thrust panel was acquired from a camera
mounted on the LSRB.
1.1.2 On-Orbit
Enhancements were made from on-orbit video views of a dislodged blanket on
the left OMS pod. Enhancements of this video was provided to Space Shuttle
program engineers for assessment of the damage. See Section 2.7.
1.1.3 Landing
Discovery landed on runway 33 at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility on
November 7, 1998 at 12:03 p.m. EST. Eleven videos and ten films were
received.
The landing touchdown appeared normal. A sink rate analysis of the main
landing gear was performed for the main gear touchdown (see Section 2.8). The
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2.1
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
DEBRIS FROM SSME IGNITION THROUGH LIFTOFF
As on previous missions, numerous light-colored pieces of debris were seen aft
of the launch vehicle before, during, and after the roll maneuver (umbilical ice
debris, RCS paper, SRB flame duct debris, and water baffle debris). Multiple
pieces of ice debris were seen falling from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals and along
the body flap during SSME ignition. (Cameras OTV009, OTV149, OTV154,
E31, E34).
An unidentified light-colored piece of debris (possible RCS paper) was seen aft
of the trailing edge of the vertical stabilizer speed brake during SSME ignition
(19:19:29.589 UTC). A second similar event was seen near the speed brake
trailing edge at the mid point level at 19:19:34.895 UTC. These debris did not
appear to be related to the drag chute door release event. (Camera E76).
A light-colored piece of debris was seen between the RSRB and the LO2 TSM
during SSME ignition (19:19:29.0 UTC). (Camera E2).
A single piece of probable flame duct debris was seen traveling near the RSRB
toward the Orbiter and then fell aft of the vehicle during liftoff (19:19:34.9
UTC). (Camera E5). A single piece of probable flame duct debris was seen
near the LSRB traveling near the LH2 TSM at liftoff (19:19:35.5 UTC).
(Camera E4).
2.2
2.3
DEBRIS DURING ASCENT
See Section 2.3.1.1, Drag Chute Door Event Timeline.
MOBILE LAUNCH PLATFORM (MLP) EVENTS
2.3.1 Drag Chute Door Release
The drag chute door was seen to separate from the Orbiter along the port edge,
pivot downward on the starboard hinge, detach, fall aft, and strike the rim of
SSME #1. The door then fell aft and was lost from view below the MLP deck.
All views of the drag chute door detaching and striking the rim of SSME #1 were
analyzed (cameras E2, E3, El9, E20, E52, E62, E63, E76, E77, OTV151,
OTV 170). Available close-up perimeter tracking camera videos and films were
screened for evidence of debris emanating from the drag chute compartment
during early ascent (E52, E54, E57). Long range tracking camera videos and
films were screened for evidence of debris emanating from the drag chute
compartment during ascent through SRB separation and beyond (E205, E207,
E208, E213, E224, ET204, ET207, ET208, ET212, KTV2, KTV4B, KTV5,
KTV7B, KTV21B).
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The launch camera films including the tracking cameras were viewed by image
analysts at the three NASA centers (KSC, MSFC, and JSC). Based on the
individual NASA center imagery screening assessments, no debris was seen near
the drag chute door compartment. Because of the excellent quality cloud-free
photography, it was concluded that material of significant size, particularly the
drag chute exiting from the drag chute compartment, would have been detected if
it had occurred prior to SRB separation and possibly would have been detected
for up to forty-five seconds after SRB separation.
The following includes examples of the more prominent events seen during
ascent:
19:19:43.477, 19:19:51.971, 19:20:01.924 19:20:04.351, 19:20:09.266 UTC
(Cameras, E207, E220, E224, ET207, ET212, KTV4B) - Light-colored flares
were seen in the SSME exhaust plume during ascent. Similar flares have been
typically seen on previous missions and are probably induced by RCS paper
debris.
19:19:52.140 UTC (Camera E52) - A single, large light-colored piece of
unidentified debris was seen falling aft near the LSRB and the ET aft dome. Due
to its position, it did not appear that it could have originated from the vicinity of
the drag chute compartment.
19:19:52.752 UTC (Camera E213) - A large piece of light-colored debris was
seen beneath the body flap (-Z side) and fell along the LSRB. This debris
appeared to be a piece of umbilical purge barrier (baggy) material.
19:19:57.875 UTC (Camera E213) - A large light-colored piece of debris was
seen near the RSRB aft skirt which was probably a piece of instafoam.
19:19:59.451 UTC (Camera E213) - A light-colored piece of debris, first seen
above (+Z) the right inboard elevon, fell aft along the SSME exhaust plume.
This debris appeared to be to the right of the Oribiter center line (+X axis).
Similar debris in this position has been seen on previous missions and is believed
to be forward RCS paper.
19:20:01.572 UTC (Camera E224) - A large, significant appearing, debris object
was seen aft of the right wing trailing edge near the RSRB aft skirt. Because of
its position, this debris did not appear to have come from the drag chute
compartment.
19:20.01.734 UTC (Camera E213) - Forward RCS paper debris was seen falling
across the leading edge of the right wing, passing over the right wing, and falling
aft near the vertical stabilizer.
19:20:09.7 through 19:20:21.37 (Camera E224) - On three occasions, light
colored objects were seen moving in the -Y direction from the mid-level of the
RSRB and again in the +Y direction from the forward tip of the LSRB. These
objects may have been birds close to the camera.
19:20:12.132 UTC (Camera E220) - A spray of multiple pieces of light-colored
debris were seen near the base of the vertical stabilizer and falling along the port
OMS pod. This debris was first seen forward of the drag chute compartment and
is believed to be RCS paper.
STS-95 JSC Summary Report A9
2. Summary of Significant Events
Figure 2.3.1.1 (A) Debris During Ascent
19:20:12.192 UTC (Camera ET207) - Two light-colored pieces of debris
(probably forward RCS paper) were seen near the aft end of the vertical
stabilizer.
19:20:40.367 UTC (Camera ET208) - An unidentified debris-like object or
objects were seen falling aft along the SRB exhaust plume.
19:20:49.095 UTC (Camera ET207) - A single light-colored piece of debris was
seen falling along the SRB exhaust plume.
Figure 2.3.1.1 (B) Debris Cloud seen near SRB plume
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19:21:02 UTC (approximate) (Camera E205) - An unidentified piece of debris
was seen near the right SRB exhaust plume approximately 1/3 of the vehicle
length aft of the vehicle. The source of this debris was not confirmed because of
the view angle. Although inconclusive, there is a remote possibility this debris
could have originated from the drag chute door compartment. Similarly
positioned unidentified debris has been seen on previous missions.
19:21:05.3 - 19:21:22.4 UTC - Recirculation or the expansion of hot burning
gasses was visible at the aft end of the Orbiter. Recirculation is a normal event
and was typically seen on previous missions.
19:21:36.343 UTC (Camera ET207) SRB separation.
2.3.1.2 Drag Chute Door Release Analysis Tasks
Door Velocity after Impact
The velocity of the door after detachment from the Orbiter was measured from
camera OTVI70. The velocity of the door at the time of impact was calculated
to be 12 + 1 ft/sec. This velocity is consistent with the door falling solely due to
gravity.
Orientation of the Door at Impact
The angle at which the door struck the SSME bell with respect to the Orbiter's xz
plane was determined. Figure 2.3.1.2 (A) shows a representation of the door
impact angle in Shuttle Structural Coordinates. The angle of impact is
designated Alpha (a). Alpha was determined to be approximately 19°+5 ° with
respect to the Orbiter's Xo-Zo plane.
Figure 2.3.1.2 (A) Drag Chute Door Impact Angle Alpha (cQ
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STS-95 Drag Chute Angular Velocity Analysis
ii<*:_
._.._ t,_ "_
Figure 2.3.1.2 (B) Sample Frame used for Angular Velocity Calculation
(Camera E20)
The angular velocity of the drag chute door was calculated immediately prior to
detachment of the door from the Orbiter. The angular velocity at the time of
door release was calculated to be 200 _ 20 degrees/sec. Comparison to a gravity
induced door rotation showed that the door did not swing out with an angular
velocity greater than would be expected due solely to gravity. This implies that
no extra force or pressure, other than gravity, was exerted on the door.
Drag Chute Door Motion Prior to Detachment
On STS-95 a line that appeared to be a "gap" or "crack" was noted along the
shear pin side (-Y) side of the drag chute door just prior to launch. The effect
was most noticeable on the high speed (400 frame per second) MLP camera E20.
Figure 3.2.1.2 (C) shows the reference coordinate system tbr the drag chute door
and Figure 3.2.1.2 (D) shows an enhancement that highlights the apparent gap
seen on one of the frames in which the gap was most evident. The gap appeared
to vary in size, having an almost on/off appearance, and was most evident on the
+Z side of the shear pin side of the door. In fact, in very few frames was the gap
seen across more than half the -Y side and in no frame, prior to door opening,
was the gap seen to extend along the entire -Y side of the door. The change in
the size of the gap was most noticeable when viewing the film very slowly at
approximately one frame per second. This effect implies that if the gap were a
real effect it would have a very high frequency (in the hundreds of Hz range)
since it appeared and disappeared every few frames. If the gap is real it is also
not clear whether we are seeing a movement of the blanket material covering the
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door and the door frame caused by the movement of the door or whether the
blanket material is simply vibrating (flapping) due to the overall vibrations
caused by SSME startup.
There was also uncertainty as to whether the gap represents a real motion or
vibration of the door or whether it is due only to some type of lighting or camera
focus problem. Review of the STS-95 film revealed a great deal of image
blurring, camera vibration, and lighting changes especially during SSME
ignition. As with the appearance of the gap, the blurring effect was also most
noticeable when viewing at one frame per second. Distinguishing between the
appearance of a true gap and the appearance of a false gap caused by film
distortion was the driver for this analysis. There were two parts to the analysis.
The first was a characterization of the frames surrounding a frame that shows an
apparent gap in the door. This analysis investigated the role that image focus
played in the appearance and disappearance of the gap. Secondly, films showing
the drag chute door from STS-80, STS-83, STS-87, and STS-90, which launched
at approximately the same time of day as STS-95, were reviewed in order to
characterize the appearance of the gap area on other missions. It was hoped that
comparison with past missions could provide a baseline for how the drag chute
door normally appears. Also review of past missions might reveal the same
effect of an apparent gap and film distortion.
I-Y)
Figure 2.3.1.2 (C) Drag Chute Door on STS-95 Reference Coordinate System
(Camera E20)
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Figure 2.3.1.2 (D) Enhanced View of Gap in Drag Chute Door
(Gap area is highlighted)
A comparison was made between frames where the gap was seen and adjacent
frames in which the gap was not seen. This comparison demonstrated that the
gap disappeared due to a change in focus. This effect suggests that the
appearance and disappearance of the gap was due only to change in camera
focus. The camera focus changed at a high frequency (i.e. every few frames)
which is probably due to slight movement of the film in the camera (there-by
moving the film relative to the focal plane) due to the excessive vibration caused
by the startup of the SSMEs.
Films from camera E20 from previous missions that launched at a similar time of
day were chosen for review. However, the door looked very different for each
mission and there was really no standard or baseline for how the gap area on the
door should appear.
The review of previous missions showed that the appearance of the area
surrounding the drag chute door is very sensitive to lighting and camera focus.
The area on the door where the apparent gap was noted on STS-95 looked
different for each mission, even when the time of launch was similar (note that
seasonal differences influencing sun angle and sky cloud cover conditions were
not accounted for.).
Although the appearance of the gap was probably caused by changes in camera
focus, the possibility of a real gap between the door and the frame or between the
blanket material and the frame cannot be totally ruled out. There is insufficient
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information to provide a conclusive answer. Also, no conclusive evidence can be
ascertained from previous missions as to whether the gap along the drag chute
door on STS-95 was real or due to camera focus and/or lighting effects.
SSME #1 Nozzle Motion
During the investigation of the loss of the drag chute door during the launch of
STS-95, a significant amount of translation in the SSME #1 nozzle location was
noticed. Further inspection of the E20 launch film revealed that this translation
began within 1/400th of a second of the initial visual indication of drag chute
door separation from the vehicle. Visual inspection of STS-91 and STS-89
launch video from the same camera perspective indicated that the magnitude of
the SSME translation was significantly larger during STS-95.
An 80 frame segment of film (0.2 seconds of elapsed time) was selected from the
E20 camera position during STS-95, STS-91 and STS-89. Each specific segment
was selected to capture maximum SSME #1 nozzle translation, as determined by
visual inspection of the launch film. Photographic analysis techniques were
employed to quantify the magnitude of the relative nozzle translation in inches
based on the known radius of the SSME bell at the nozzle. Table 2.3.1.2 lists the
specific time sequence analyzed for each mission, the maximum translation seen
in each axes and uncertainty in the positional estimates.
Mission
Number
STS-95
STS-91
STS-89
Thae
Sequence
(in GMT)
19:19'30.673
to
19:19'30.868
22.06"20.828
to
22 .06 2.1.023
02:48:11.688
to
02:48:11.886
Range of
Movement in
Y Axis
(in inches)
-6.2"
to
13"
-1.6"
to
0.8"
-3.2"
to
3.6"
Range of
Movement in
Z Axis
(in inches)
-6.0"
to
3.2"
-3.0"
to
1.6"
-1.4"
to
2.0"
Maximum Estinated
Uncertainty of any Point
Location
(in inches)
0.5 _
.5"
0.T'
Table 2.3.1.2 SSME #1 Nozzle Motion on STS-95, STS-91, and STS-89
Plots displaying the relative movement an observer would see in the center of the
engine nozzle if they were positioned behind the vehicle looking forward at the
SSMEs are shown in Figure 2.3.1.2 (E). The axes of the plots are oriented within
+/- 5 degrees of the Y and Z axes of the Shuttle Coordinate System. The relative
movement shown on each plot begins at the 0,0 coordinate location. The plots
compare the magnitude of relative movement for each mission, but does not infer
any absolute positional relationship between the SSME center locations during
the three missions.
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Figure 2.3.1.2 (E) SSME #1 Relative Motion Plots for STS-95, STS-91, and
STS-89
Flash in SSME #1 Plume
An orange-yellow-colored flash was seen in the SSME #l exhaust plume during
engine start-up on the camera E2 film. Previous mission films and videos of
SSME ignitions were reviewed. A flash in the SSME #1 exhaust plume during
the engine start-up was seen on the STS-91 camera E2 film. This flash appeared
very similar to the one observed on STS-95 during the SSME #1 start-up. Based
on the STS-91 observation and the presence of flashes seen on other previous
missions, it was concluded that the flash observed on STS-95 was not an
anomalous event.
Imagery. Products
Example images of the drag chute door release were provided to the Drag Chute
Door Release Investigation Team. Included were the "best effort" image
enlargements/enhancements of the apparent gap just prior to door release, the
inside of the door after door release, the port edge of the door showing the area
of the shear pins, the starboard door edge showing the area of the hinges, the
drag chute and mortar inside the compartment, and the debris seen at the time of
the door detachment from the Orbiter. Film-to-video conversions of four
representative tracking camera views of the launch vehicle from lift-off through
ascent to SRB separation and beyond were also provided to the investigation
team.
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2.3.2 Other Mobile Launch Platform Events
Orange vapor, probably free burning hydrogen, was seen forward of the SSME
rims during SSME ignition (El9, E20, E76). Orange vapors drifting forward
from the aft end of the vehicle have been observed on previous missions.
During SSME ignition, the SSME Mach diamonds did not form in the expected
sequence based on the analysis of the high-speed engineering films. The times
for the Mach diamond formation recorded in Table 2.3.2 below are from camera
film El9.
SSME TIME (UTC)
SSME #2 19:19:30.760
SSME #1 19:19:30.877
SSME #3 19:19:30.937
Table 2.3.2 SSME Mach Diamond Formation
r
2.4
2.5
ASCENT EVENTS
Body flap motion was visible during ascent (ET207, E207, E212). JSC-EP
engineers compared the body flap position data to their experience data base.
From the positional data, the body flap motion was assessed to be within the
range of that noted on previous missions. No follow-up action was requested.
See Section 2.3.1.1, Drag Chute Door Event Timeline, for additional events seen
during ascent.
ONBOARD PHOTOGRAPHY OF THEEXTERNAL TANK
2.5.1 Analysis of the Umbilical Well Camera Films
Umbilical well cameras flew for the second time on OV-103 on STS-95. Two
rolls of the STS-95 16mm umbilical well film, one roll of 35mm umbilical welt
film, and one roll of 35mm handheld film were received. The +X translation
maneuver was performed on STS-95 to facilitate the imaging of the ET with the
umbilical well cameras. The film quality is very good.
35mm Umbilical Well Camera Film
The LH2 tank and the LO2 tank/Ojive TPS appear to be in excellent condition on
the close-up 35mm umbilical well camera film. The sanded area on the LO2
nose cone appears undamaged. Similar to STS-90, STS-91, and other previous
missions, a gray-colored band of pock marked or possible missing TPS is visible
on the +Z ET nose just aft of the ET nose cone fairing. Discoloration in this area
is probably due to aero friction and heating. The RSRB separation motor burn
scar appeared typical of previous missions with only a small area of possible
very shallow divoting visible.
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Figure 2.5.1 (A) 35 mm Umbilical Well Camera View of the ET Intertank
Two large divots (approximately 7 inches in size) are visible on the LH2 tank-to-
intertank close out flange between the legs of the forward ET/Orbiter attach
bipod (annotation 1). The divots have sufficient depth to show shadow but
probably not primed substrate. A smaller third divot is visible on the same
flange near the right (+Y) foot of the forward bipod (annotation 2). The bipod
jack pad close-outs appeared intact. An intertank stringer head divot
approximately seven inches in length is visible in the -Y direction from the +Z
intertank aero vent (annotation 3). Approximately ten very small, randomly
located, divots were counted on the intertank stringer heads.
The visible portion (+Z/+Y) of the right SRB thrust panel is in direct sun light on
the 35mm umbilical well film. A bright divot estimated to be seven inches in
size is visible on the +Y thrust panel forward of the RSRB forward attach
(annotation 4). Approximately ten shallow divots estimated to be approximately
three inches in size appear to be present near the same attach. The left (-Y) SRB
thrust panel is not imaged on the 35mm umbilical well film.
Minor TPS chipping and very small divots (typical of previous missions) were
seen on the LO2 feedline, feedline flanges, and on the forward end of the +Y
ET/Orbiter thrust strut. Ablation and divoting of the TPS on the vertical section
of the +Y electric cable tray adjacent to the LO2 umbilical is visible. A divot
approximately six inches in size is visible between the LO2 feedline and the
electric cable tray on the LH2 tank TPS just forward of the forward end of the
+Y thrust strut. Two shallow divots estimated to be approximately three inches
in size are visible on the LH2 tank TPS forward of the cross beam. Multiple, but
insignificant appearing, shallow "pop corn" divots are visible on the aft LH2 tank
TPS. "Pop corn" divots in this location were typically seen on previous mission
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films. The shallow "pop corn" divots visible on the ET aft dome appear to be
less than typically seen on previous mission films.
The face of the LO2 umbilical carrier plate appeared to be in excellent condition
(the lightning contact strips appeared to be in place).
16ram Umbilical Well Camera Film
Two rolls of the STS-95 16ram umbilical well film were received. The film
quality is very good on the two 16mm umbilical well camera films. However,
the -Y side of the ET is in shadow and is too dark for analysis. OV-103 provided
timing data to the 16mm umbilical well cameras.
The LSRB separation appeared normal on the 16mm umbilical well camera
films. Numerous light-colored pieces of debris (insulation), and dark debris
(charred insulation) were seen throughout the SRB separation film sequence.
Typical ablation and charring of the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical electric cable tray
and the aft surface of the -Y upper strut fairing prior to SRB separation were
seen. Numerous irregularly-shaped pieces of debris (charred insulation) were
noted near the base of the LSRB electric cable tray prior to SRB separation.
Pieces of TPS were seen to detach from the aft surface of the horizontal section
of the -YET vertical strut. Normal blistering of the fire barrier material on the
outboard side of the LH2 umbilical was seen. Ablation of the TPS on the aft
dome was less than usual. Both the left and right SRB nose caps were visible
during SRB separation.
The ET separation from the Orbiter appeared normal. Typical vapor and
multiple light colored pieces of debris were seen after the umbilical separation.
Figure 2.5.1 (B) 16 mm Umbilical Well Camera View of the ET LH2 Umbilical
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No anomalies were noted on the face of the LH2 umbilical after ET separation.
As typically seen on previous missions, frozen hydrogen was visible on the
orifice of the LH2 17 inch connect. Typical small erosion marks are visible on
both the +Y and -Y thrust struts. No anomalous conditions on the +Z of the ET
other than those seen at better resolution on the 35ram umbilical well film were
noted.
Dark-colored linear-shaped marks, possibly from shock waves off the right EB
fitting, were visible extending diagonally across the +Y/+Z intertank stringer
heads toward the bipod.
2.5.2 Analysis of the Handheld Photography of the ET
The STS-95 handheld film of the External Tank (ET-98) is good quality with
both good focus and, except for shadowed areas, good exposure. Timing data is
present on the handheld film. The first picture was taken at 13:40
(minutes:seconds) MET.
The astronauts performed a manual pitch maneuver from the heads-up position to
bring the ET into view in the Orbiter overhead windows for the handheld
photography. (STS-95 was the fifth flight using the roll-to-heads-up maneuver).
,g
Figure 2.5.2 (A) 35 mm Handheld Camera View of the +Y/-Z sides of the ET
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Screening Summary_
Sixty-five images of the ET were acquired using the handheld 35mm Nikon
camera with a 400mm lens (rolls 393 and 394).
The images of the ET are silhouetted by the late afternoon sun which resulted in
large areas of shadow on the ET that hindered analysis. Views of the +Y side of
the ET and the ET nose were acquired including the +Y thrust panel. No views
of the -Y thrust panel or the -Y axis of the ET were obtained. Enhancements
were made to bring out detail in the shadowed areas including the +Y thrust
panel in the -Y direction from the EO fitting. If present, divots greater than three
inches in size should have been detectable on the sun lit portion of the +Y thrust
panel and may have been detectable in the enhanced shadow area. However
none were confirmed. On the enhanced image of the shadow area, several light-
colored marks (possible, but not confirmed divots) are visible on the +Y/-Z LH2
tank-to-intertank close out flange. The normal SRB separation burn scars and
aero-heating marks were noted on the +Y intertank and nose TPS of the ET.
The distance of the ET from the Orbiter was calculated to be approximately 1.1
km on the first photographic frame acquired. The separation rate from the
Orbiter was calculated from the first 18 frames of photography (prior to venting)
to be 5.5 m/sec.
Venting from what appeared to be the -Y intertank hydrogen vent is visible on
four frames (see Table 2.5.2(A). The venting occurred approximately four
minutes later on STS-95 than was seen on the previous mission (STS-91 ) film.
E'I - Hindl_-kl %'idt, m
Figure 2.5.2 (B) Handheld Video Camera View of the ET and Debris
Extensive venting from the -Y intertank hydrogen vent is also visible on the
handheld video of the ET. Venting and white-colored debris (frozen hydrogen)
are visible originating from the vicinity of the LH2 umbilical. See Figure 2.5.2
(B). These events occurred when the ET was an estimated distance of two to
three kilometers from the Orbiter.
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FRAME
i
GMT TIME
(Hr:Min:Sec)
u, i . i i.iiiid_ci_l_m,l.,,El_a
MET
(Min:Sec)
STS-95-394-014 19:40:32 20:58
STS-95-394-015 19:40:33 20:59
STS-95-394-016 19:40:33 20:59
STS-95-394-017 19:40:34 21:00
Table 2.5.2 (A) ET Venting Times from Handheld Film Camera
The ET rate of tumble, i.e., the end-to-end rotation of the ET about its center of
mass and the rate of roll about the ET X axis was very slow (less than one
degree/sec) prior to the ET venting (seen at approximately 21 minutes MET).
Table 2.5.2(B) contains a comparison of the averaged tumble rate measurements
for the previous four Space Shuttle missions. Venting was seen on all five
missions.
MISSION TUMBLE RATE MET
(Degrees/Second) (Min:Sec)
STS-87 11 17:23 - 18:08
STS-89 12 31:42 - 35:27
STS-90 3 14:30"
STS-91 11 16:29 - 18:46
STS-95 < 1 13:40 - 20:50
* Only the first four frames had timing. Relative time from video was used to
determine the STS-90 tumble rate.
Table 2.5.2 (B) ET Tumble Rates
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2.6 SRB CAMERA VIEW OF ET THRUST PANEL
BEFORE
P_or _o 94 sec MET
AFTER
- 122 _ k,IET
Figure 2.6 (A) ET Thrust Panel Video - Before and After Ablation
Excellent quality video of the ET thrust panel was acquired from the left SRB
camera. Multiple small divots, most less than one inch in size, were seen to form
on the STS-95 -YET Thrust Panel video between 92 and 120 seconds MET. See
the "before and after" views shown on Figure 2.6 (A). The majority of the divots
occurred on the top surface of the rib heads. The divots were shallow and no
exposed substrate was detected. Also, a darkening of the TPS along with a more
coarse appearing texture of the TPS caused by the ablation of the TPS surface
material is apparent on the "after" view. For scale reference, the visible star (*)
patterns painted on the thrust panel rib heads are one inch in size and are spaced
at 5.5 inch intervals along the rib heads in the X axis direction.
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Figure 2.6 (B) -Y Thrust Panel Measurement Area
Sixty-four areas of ablation larger than 0.1 inches in diameter were identified on
the surface of the External Tank -Y Thrust Panel video view. This ablation
began 30 seconds prior to SRB separation. Using a variable image scale derived
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from a pattern of one-inch wide star-shaped markings placed on the panel prior
to launch, a maximum diameter and a mean diameter was measured for each
ablation area within a predefined region of interest covering 650 +/-50 square
inches.
Each ablation area is expected to have created a similarly sized particle, with a
few exceptions• Five ablation areas were observed to have been created in
successive incremental steps, rather than at once, and the smaller sizes of the
resulting particles have been noted.
The resultant particle sizes were determined in two ways, one using the
maximum diameter of the ellipse best fit to each ablation area, and another using
twice the mean radius measured from the center of each area.
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Figure 2.6 (C) Size Distribution for Maximum Diameter of Particles Originating
from STS-95 External Tank -Y Thrust Panel Ablation.
The histogram shown in Figure 2.6(C) gives the frequency of particles having
maximum diameters that fall within the specified ranges• Three ablation
features (IDs 1, 3, 64) were outside the predefined region of interest and were not
included in the histogram. A complete list of the maximum and mean diameter
measurements for each particle is provided in Table 2.6.
By taking the maximum diameter, 13 particles would have been larger than one
inch, and two of these would have been larger than 2 inches• One of the three
ablation areas outside the region of interest (ID 64) was estimated to be larger
than 1.7 inches, and may have been larger than 2.0 inches, but an accurate image
scale could not be determined for this area.
It should be noted that the count for particles smaller than 0.5 inches is not a
complete count for features within this size range. Also, the selected area of
interest includes surface areas that are hidden from view. These areas constitute
the sides of the rib-like stringers oriented horizontally in the image. While these
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areas may have contributed to the total amount of debris, they did not contribute
to this analysis and were not considered in the calculation of the area of interest.
Table 2.6 Measurements of Ablation Areas Identified in Fi 2.6 (B)
Ablation Number Major Axis Mean Percent of Local Maximum Mean
Area of of Area Radius Whole image Diameter of Diameter oi
ID Pixels (pixels) of Area (if piece- Scale Resultant Resultant
(pixels) wise) (incheslpix) Debris Debris
(inches) (inches)
1 37 7.6 30 0.111 o.85 066
2 14 4.6 1.7 0.059 0.27 0.20
3 16 4.8 1.8 0.111 0.53 0.41
4 12 4.9 1.5 0.059 0.29 0.18
5 14 5.0 1.7 0.056 0.26 0.19
6 18 56 2.0 0.056 0.31 0.22
7 13 5.2 1.7 0.056 0.29 0.18
8 111 18.5 5.9 0.056 ....
8a -- 40% 0.056 0.4t 0.26
8b -- 20% 0.056 0.21 0.13
8c -- 40% 0.056 0.41 0.26
9 158 19.6 6,8 0.056 1,09 0.75
10 81 15.1 4.7 0.059 ....
10a .... 30% 0.059 0.27 0.17
lob .... 70°/, 0.059 0.62 0.39
11 60 12.0 4.0 0.056 0.67 0.44
12 19 6.6 22 0.091 0.60 0.39
13 72 12.9 4.4 0.067 0.86 0.56
14 32 8.0 2.9 0.083 0.67 0.49
15 22 6.7 2.3 0.067 0.45 0.30
16 24 6.5 2.4 0.071 0.47 0.34
17 17 5.1 1.9 0.077 0.39 0.30
18 10 4.0 1.4 0.091 0.36 0.25
19 9 3.7 1.3 0.100 0.37 0.26
20 12 4.0 1.6 0.111 0.44 0.35
21 12 4.8 1.5 0.091 0.43 0.28
22 31 8.5 2.7 0.100 0.85 0.54
23 24 8.3 2.4 0.111 0.93 0.54
24 66 13.0 4.3 0.125 1.62 1.06
25 14 4.4 1.7 0.111 0.49 0.37
26 104 15.1 5.4 0.143 ....
26a .... 60% 0.143 1.29 0.92
26b ...... 40% 0.143 0.66 0.62
27 11 4.3 1.5 0.091 0.39 0.26
28 33 7.3 2.8 0.167 1.22 0.94
29 15 4.9 1.8 0.059 0.29 0.21
30 22 6.1 2.3 0.059 0.36 0.27
31 4 2.1 0.7 0.063 0.13 0.09
32 49 10.2 3.5 0.063 0.64 0.44
33 8 4,6 1.2 0.083 0.38 0.20
34 34 8,8 2.9 0.067 0,59 0.36
35 6 3.2 1.1 0.063 0,20 0.13
36 33 8,2 2,8 0.059 0,48 0.33
37 28 8,8 2,6 0.059 0.52 0.31
38 34 10.3 3.0 0.059 0.60 0.35
39 13 4.9 1.6 0.063 0.31 0.20
40 10 5.8 1.4 0.059 0.34 0.17
41 21 6.3 2.1 0.077 0.48 0.33
42 22 6.9 2.2 0.067 --
42a ..... 20% 0.067 0.09 0.06
42b ..... 80% 0.067 0.37 0.24
43 32 7.8 2.8 0.071 0.55 0.40
44 6 3.4 0.9 0.083 0.28 0.16
45 25 10.0 2.7 0.071 0.71 0.38
46 45 11.1 3.5 0.071 0.79 0.51
47 54 11.4 3.8 0.083 0.95 0.63
48 155 23.1 7.1 0.100 --
48a 155 23.1 7.1 50°/,= 0,100 1,15 0.71
48b 165 23.1 7.1 50% 0.100 1,15 0.71
49 79 13,4 4.6 0,125 1.68 1.16
50 24 6.0 2.4 0,167 1.01 0.79
51 23 6.2 2.3 0,091 0.56 0.41
52 22 6.8 2.3 0,077 0,52 0.35
53 25 7.9 2.4 0.083 0,66 0.41
54 37 13,5 3.5 0.083 1.12 0.58
55 6 3.2 1.1 0.083 0.27 O. 18
56 28 9.2 2.8 0.100 0.92 0.55
57 15 6.0 1.8 0.111 0.67 0.40
58 81 14.6 4.7 0.167 2.43 1.58
59 24 7,3 2.4 0.143 1.04 0.67
60 68 12.0 4.2 0.200 2.40 1.69
61 21 6.2 2.1 0.167 1.04 0.71
62 6 3.4 0.9 0.200 0.68 0.38
63 16 6.3 1.9 0.083 0.53 0.32
64 ......... >I 30"
* An accurate scale measurement could not be made.
#60.
The size constraint is based on a visual comparison with ID
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After ET separation, no divots were observed on the views showing the ET thrust
panel aft of the EB fitting, the ET intertank region extending to the access door,
the LH2 tank -Z TPS, or the ET aft dome.
2.7 ON-ORBIT SUPPORT
Figure 2.7 Dislodged OMS Blanket
Video images of a dislodged port OMS pod blanket were down linked by the
crew. Image enhancements of this dislodged blanket were provided to the MER
Manager prior to landing.
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2.8 LANDING EVENTS
2.8.1 Landing Sink Rate Analysis
Image data from video camera SLF South was used to determine the landing sink
rate of the main gear. In the analysis, data from approximately one second of
imagery immediately prior to touchdown was considered. Data points defining
the main gear struts were collected on every frame (30 frames of the data during
the last second prior to touch down). An assumption was made that the line of
sight of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter's y-axis. The distance
between the main gear struts was used as a scaling factor. The main gear height
above the runway was calculated by the vertical difference between the main
gear struts and the reference point. These heights were then regressed with
respect to time and the trendline was determined. Sink rate equals the slope of
this regression line.
The left main gear sink rate for STS-95 landing at one second, at half a second,
and at a one quarter of a second are provided in Table 2.8.1. A plot describing
these sink rate is provided in Figure 2.8.1.
m_
Time Prior to 1.00 Sec. 0.50 Sec. 0.25 Sec.
Touchdown
Left Main Gear Sink 1.7 ft/sec 1.7 ft/sec 1.9 ft/sec
Rate
Estimated Error (lc) + 0.2 ft/sec + 0.2 ft/sec + 0.1 ft/sec
Left Main Gear Touchdown = 311:17:03:29.900 (UTC)
Table 2.8.1 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate
The maximum allowable main gear sink rate values are 9.6 ft/sec for a 212,000
lb vehicle and 6.0 ft/sec for a 240,000 lb vehicle. The landing weight of the
STS-95 vehicle was estimated to be 228,639 lbs.
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STS-95 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate
(Video - SLF South)
6
5
" 4
.=
a 1.7 ft/sec (+/- 0.2)
/
1.7 ft/sec (+/- 0.2)
2 _i 1.9 fffsec (+/- 0.1)
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Figure 2.8.1 Main Gear Landing Sink Rate
2.9 OTHER
2.9.1 Normal Events
Normal events observed included elevon and body flap motion prior to liftoff,
RCS paper debris from SSME ignition through liftoff, ET twang, ice and vapor
from the LO2 and LH2 TSM T-0 umbilicals prior to and after disconnect,
multiple pieces of ET/Orbiter umbilical ice debris falling along the body flap
during liftoff, acoustic waves in the exhaust cloud during liftoff, debris in the
exhaust cloud after liftoff, expansion waves after liftoff, vapor off the SRB
stiffener rings, charring of the ET aft dome, ET aft dome outgassing,
condensation around the launch vehicle during ascent, linear optical effects,
recirculation, SRB plume brightening, and slag debris during and after SRB
separation.
2.9.2 Normal Pad Events
Normal pad events observed included the Hydrogen burn ignitor operation, the
FSS deluge water activation, the MLP deluge water activation, GH2 vent arm
retraction, TSM T-0 umbilical operations, and TSM door closure.
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Introduction
The launch of space shuttle mission STS-95, the twenty-fifth flight of the Orbiter Discovery occurred on
October 29, 1998, at approximately 1:I 9 P.M. Central Daylight Time from launch complex 39B
(LC-39B), Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Launch time to be reported as 98:302:19:19:33.984
Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) by the MSFC Flight Evaluation Team. Photographic and video
coverage has been evaluated to determine proper operation of the flight hardware. Video and high-speed
film cameras providing this coverage are located on the fixed service structure (FSS), mobile launch
platform (MLP), LC-39B perimeter sites, Eastern Test Range tracking sites and onboard the vehicle.
Engineering Analysis Objectives
The planned engineering photographic and video analysis objectives for STS-95 include, but are not
limited to the following:
• Verification of cameras, lighting and timing systems.
• Overall propulsion system coverage for anomaly detection and structural integrity.
• Determination of SRB PIC firing time and SRB separation time.
• Verification of SRB and ET Thermal Protection System (TPS) integrity.
• Correct operation of the following:
o SSME ignition and mainstage
o SRB debris containment system
o LH2 and LO2 17-inch disconnects
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o Ground umbilical carrier plate
o Free hydrogen ignitors
o Booster separation motors
Camera Coverage Assessment
The following table illustrates the camera coverage received at MSFC for STS-95.
16mm 35mm Video
MLP 16 0 4
FSS 5 0 3
Perimeter 0 7 5
:Tr_icking 0 10 i 1
Onboard 2 2 2
Totals 23 19 25
Total number of film and videos received to date: 67
An individual motion picture camera assessment is provided as Appendix A. Appendix B contains
detailed assessments of the video products received at MSFC.
Ground Camera Coverage
Ground based photographic coverage of the STS-95 was considered excellent. The clear sky and the
afternoon sun provided excellent conditions for the long range tracking cameras. However, some cameras
experienced problems. Camera E9 experienced film fog which rendered the data unusable. Camera E223
never acquired the vehicle. IRIG timing was not recorded on camera E205.
Onboard Camera Coverage
The 8mm video camera which was placed in the forward skirt of the left SRB to view the ET Thrust Panel
provided excellent data on the condition of the Thrust Panel TPS during launch. This camera also
provided an good view of SRB separation.
a A standard speed 8mm video camera was flown on the Forward Segment of the Lett
SRB to view the condition of the TPS on the ET Thrust Panel during ascent of the
vehicle. The camera was recovered with the SRB after the launch.
The video camera is supplied with a wide angle lens to view as much of the ET
thrust panel as possible. The wide angle lens and the close proximity of the ET
results in image distortion of the Thrust Panel.
A grid of one inch black squares and "*" symbols have been placed on the Thrust
Panel to aid Engineering Photo Analysis in determining size and location of TPS
divots. The resulting camera field of view and grid are illustrated in this chart.
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Also onboard were two 16mm film cameras located in the Orbiter's LH2 umbilical well. These cameras
recorded SRB and ET separation and provided excellent results. A 35mm still camera was in a the LO2
umbilical well recording images of the ET after separation. This camera also provided excellent results
Anomalies
The Drag chute door detached from the Orbiter during SSME ignition, striking
SSME #1 nozzle near the Aft Manifold. No damage to the engine was visible.
This sequence shows a close-up of the door striking the engine nozzle.
Observations
ET Thrust Panel
This is an image of the ET Thrust Panel early during powered flight.
The following images view the ET Thrust Panel just prior to and after SRB separation:
This image shows the right SRB after separation.
An engine streak from long-range video camera ET-207. This event was timed from
film camera E-207 at 302:19:20:04.372 UTC.
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A comparison of the startup motion of SSME #1 on STS-95, STS-91, and STS-89
(1.2 MB MPEG video).
T-Zero Times
T-Zero times are determined from cameras that view the SRB holddown posts numbers M-1, M-2, M-5,
and M-6. These cameras record the explosive bolt combustion products.
Holddown Post Camera Position Time (UTC)
M- 1 E9 Fogged film
M-2 E8 19:19i33.992
M-5 El2 19:19:33.993
M-6 El3 i9:i9i33.993
SRB Separation Time
SRB separation as recorded by observations of the BSM combustion products from the long-range film
camera E-207 occurred at 302:19:21:36.38 UTC.
Appendix A - Individual _m camera assessments
Appendix B - Individual video camera assessments
Appendix C - Definitions and acronyms
Individual film/video summary_ report
Return to Engineering Photographic Analysis Reports
Return to MSFC Engineering Photographic Analysis Home Page
Point of Contact and Curator of this document:
Tom Rieckho ff/E P 73
Marshall Space Flight Center
Huntsville, AI 35812
256-544-7677
Tom.Rieckhoff@msfc. nasa.gov
B4
4 of 4 1/27/99 3:42 PM
